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Abstract	The	present	paper	aims	at	assessing	the	possible	efficiency	of	 the	principle	of	national	contributions,	 assumed	 in	 the	 2015	 Paris	 Framework	 Convention	 on	 Climate	 Change.	Strong	historical	 evidence	 indicates	 that	 any	 significant	 development	 of	 constitutional	states	 used	 to	 take	 place,	 in	 the	 past,	 on	 the	 rising	 tide	 of	 demographic	 growth.	Presently,	 we	 are	 facing	 global	 demographic	 slowdown,	 and	 contesters	 argue	 that	constitutional	 states	 are	 not	 the	 right	 address	 to	 write	 to	 if	 we	 want	 breakthrough	technological	 change.	 This	 paper	 assumes	 that	 the	 capacity	 of	 constitutional	 states	 to	carry	out	the	obligations	declared	 in	the	Framework	Convention,	 i.e.	 to	carry	out	deep	technological	changes	in	the	global	economy,	depends	on	their	economic	power,	which	can	be	 estimated	 as	 their	 capacity	 to	 appropriate	 capital.	 Empirical	 data,	 examined	 in	this	 article,	 indicates	 that	 since	 the	1980s,	 constitutional	 states	have	been	 losing	 their	economic	 power,	 and	 that	 the	 overall	 technological	 progress	 is	 more	 and	 more	disconnected	 from	 that	 economic	 power	 of	 governments.	 Moreover,	 constitutional	states	seem	to	be	losing	their	capacity	to	experiment	with	their	own	institutions.	
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Introduction		December	the	12th,	2015,	the	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	was	signed	in	Paris,	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 United	 Nations.	 It	marks	 an	 important	 step	 in	 facing	 the	seemingly	biggest	challenge	for	our	civilisation,	namely	the	passage	from	fossil	fuels	to	renewable	energies,	as	well	as	the	implications	of	the	already	happening	climate	change.	The	 Framework	 Convention	 is	 based	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 nationally	 determined	contributions,	 from	 the	part	of	 signatory	states.	Thus,	 constitutional	 state	 seems	 to	be	the	 pivotal	 structure	 of	 economic	 governance	 as	 the	 mankind	 is	 facing	 probably	 the	biggest	challenge	in	its	history:	the	climate	change.	Yet,	some	contesters	argue	that	the	constitutional	state	is	not	really	the	best	structure	for	handling	significant,	civilizational	challenges	 (see	 for	 example:	 Heath	 1957 1 ;	 McCallum	 1970 2 ;	 Steinberg,	 Nyman,	Caraccioli	 20113;	 Friedman,	 Taylor	 20104).	 A	 general	 question	 emerges:	 will	 that	philosophy	of	national	contributions	work	as	for	handling	the	climate	change?	In	other	words,	 are	 the	 constitutional	 states	 really	 able	 to	 endorse	 the	 role	 of	 dominant	 social	structures	in	facing	that	huge	civilizational	challenge	that	we	are	facing	right	now?	The	 most	 fundamental	 assumption	 behind	 this	 general	 question	 is	 that	 at	 the	 global	scale	we	 can	 talk	 about	 the	 state	 as	 a	 distinct	 type	 of	 social	 structure,	 different	 from	corporate	or	cooperative	structures.	Thus,	the	actual	outcomes	of	the	2015	Framework	Convention	in	Climate	Change	depend	on	the	general	properties	of	that	typical	structure,	and	 not	 just	 on	 a	 more	 or	 less	 random,	 individual	 capacities	 of	 each	 constitutional,	national	state	taken	separately.	This	specific	point	of	view	is	essentially	consistent	with	both	the	works	of	Max	Weber	(Weber	19785),	and	with	the	French	historical	school.	The	latter	claims	that	in	the	European	culture,	significant	institutional	changes	leading	to	the	emergence	of	 the	presently	known	constitutional	 state	 took	place	on	 the	rising	 tide	of	demographic	 revivals	 after	 major	 demographic	 slumps,	 associated	 with	 big	 waves	 of	technological	change.	There	were	three	such	big	revivals	after	big	depressions	(see	for																																																									
1	Heath,	S.,	1957,	Citadel,	Market,	and	Altar.	Emerging	Society.	Outline	of	Socionomy,	The	New	Natural	Science	of	Society,	THE	SCIENCE	OF	
SOCIETY	FOUNDATION,	INC.,	Baltimore	
2	McCallum,	H.S.,	1970,	The	Art	of	Community,	Institute	for	Humane	Studies,	Inc.	Menlo	Park,	California		
3	Steinberg,	P.E,	Nyman,	E.,	Caraccioli,	M.J.,	2011,	Atlas	Swam:	Freedom,	Capital,	and	Floating	Sovereignties	in	the	Seasteading	Vision,	
Antipode	Vol.	00	No.	0	2011	ISSN	0066-4812,	pp	1–19		
4 Friedman, P., Taylor, B., 2010, Seasteading: Institutional Innovation on the Open Ocean, Paper presented at the Australasian Public Choice 
Society Conference, December 9-10, 2010, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand  
5 Weber, Max. Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. Univ of California Press, 1978 
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example:	Braudel	19816;	Braudel	19837).	The	 first	one	 is	 to	notice	between	1100	and	1350,	 and	 it	was	 that	mounting	 flow	of	 population	 that	made	 the	 background	 for	 the	first	entity	recognized	as	a	modern	state,	namely	to	the	kingdom	of	Two	Sicilies	under	Frederick	 II	 (1194	 –	 1250).	 During	 this	 period,	 Europe	 developed	 its	 system	 of	agriculture	and	food	supply.	That	system	reached	the	limits	of	its	capacity	about	1350.	Between	1350	and	1450,	the	European	continent	experienced	a	significant	demographic	and	economic	depression.	The	 trend	 reversed	after	1450,	 and	 it	was	 the	 turn	of	wind	power	and	waterpower	to	be	harnessed	with	the	technology	of	mills.	That	technological	wave	was	associated	with	another	leap	in	the	institutional	development	of	the	state:	 it	was	 precisely	 when	 the	 three	 monarchs	 that	 Francis	 Bacon	 called	 ‘Three	Wise	 Men’,	namely:	 Henry	 VII	 Tudor,	 Louis	 XI	 of	 France,	 and	 Ferdinand	 of	 Spain,	 created	 really	modern	 states,	 with	 armies,	 financial	 systems	 and	 distinct	 administrative	 structures.	After	1650,	until	about	1750,	Europe	experienced	still	another	demographic	depression,	and	we	can	notice	that	the	pattern	of	constitutional,	republican	state	that	we	know	today	emerged	 only	 after	 1750,	 and	 its	 emergence	was	 associated	with	 the	 development	 of	large	–	scale	industry.	It	is	to	notice	that	each	of	the	big	technological	waves	in	question	required	 an	 important	 reallocation	 of	 capital.	 The	 institutions	 of	 the	 state	 could	 be	possibly	an	active	participant	 in	 such	 reallocation.	 Some	 theorists	 even	go	 to	 claiming	that	state	as	an	institution	mostly	developed	in	order	to	provide	accurate	protection	and	robustness	to	private	property	rights	(see	for	example:	Schlatter	19518).			Currently,	 we	 are	 living	 a	 period,	 which,	 fault	 of	 a	 better	 word,	 can	 be	 called	 ‘global	slowdown’.	 	 Some	 civilizational	 processes	 –	 demographic	 growth,	 economic	 growth,	urbanization,	 productivity	 growth,	 human	 mobility,	 inflation	 -	 have	 been	 developing	over	many	decades,	 and	now,	whilst	 still	 having	 some	momentum,	 they	 seem	 to	 slow	down.	Demographic	growth	of	 the	global	population,	as	measured	by	 the	World	Bank,	was	 of	 1,2%	 in	 2014,	 as	 compared	 to	 1,73%	 in	 1990.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 global	capital	stock,	estimated	currently	at	some	250	quadrillions	of	constant	2005	US$,	grows	faster	than	the	global	GDP.	In	1950,	global	capital	stock	made	2,43	times	the	global	GDP.	In	1990,	that	proportion	climbed	to	2,62	times,	and	reached	3,32	in	2011.	On	the	other	hand,	 aggregate	depreciation	of	 the	 capital	 stock	makes	 a	 growing	 share	of	 the	 global																																																									
6 Braudel, F., 1981, Civilization and Capitalism, Vol. I: The Structures of Everyday Life, rev.ed., English Translation, William Collins Sons 
& Co London and Harper & Row New York, ISBN 00216303 9 
7 Braudel, F., 1983, Civilisation and Capitalism. Part II: The Wheels of Commerce, trans. Sian Reynolds, Book Club Associates, William 
Collins Sons & Co, pp. 514 - 555 
8 Schlatter, R., 1951, Private property, the history of an idea, New Brunswick : N.J., Rutgers University Press 
Are	constitutional	states	able	to	drive	the	global	technological	change?	
	 4	
GDP.	In	1990,	it	was	10,59%,	and	in	2011	that	share	was	of	13,44%.	The	global	economy	accumulates	 more	 and	 more	 capital,	 and	 compensating	 the	 obsolescence	 of	 the	corresponding	assets	gains	in	macroeconomic	importance.	The	average,	national,	Total	Factor	 Productivity	 	 (TFP),	 measured	 in	 constant	 prices	 of	 2005,	 stopped	 growing	consistently	in	the	mid	1960s.	Since	then,	the	TFP	oscillates	and	seems	unable	to	break	the	 ceiling	 of	 TFP	=	 1,07.	 Currently,	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 at	 around	1,04,	 on	 average,	 in	 the	global	 economy.	 Thus,	 the	 prospects	 for	 consistently	 increasing	 productivity	 through	innovation	seem	quite	vague9.	The	current	macroeconomic	landscape	seems	disquieting.	Economic	growth	is	slow,	and	likely	to	slow	down	even	more.	Deflation,	especially	in	the	prices	of	raw	materials	and	fossil	resources,	becomes	a	fact.	On	the	whole,	more	threats	than	 opportunities	 loom	 at	 the	 horizon	 (IMF	 201510).	 Some	 experts	 say	 directly	 that	global	growth	falls	short	of	expectations	(World	Bank	2016a11).	According	to	the	World	Trade	Organization,	growth	in	global	trade	since	2011	through	2014,	and	in	the	first	half	of	2015,	marked	a	historical	slowdown.	Up	until	2010,	global	trade	used	to	grow	twice	as	fast	as	global	GDP.	Since	2011,	that	pattern	seems	to	have	been	broken,	and	trade	has	been	 growing	 at	 a	 pace	 close	 to	 that	 of	 global	 output	 (WTO	201512).	 Focused	 studies,	conducted	 by	 the	World	 Bank,	 regarding	 the	 global	 outcomes	 of	 digital	 technologies,	show	 that	 the	 global	 diffusion	 of	 digital	 technologies	 is	 rather	 a	 somehow	 sluggish	evolution,	 instead	 of	 being	 the	 so-called	 ‘digital	 revolution’.	 Gains	 from	 the	implementation	 of	 digital	 technologies	 have	 been	 clearly	 lagging	 behind	 the	dissemination	 of	 technologies	 themselves.	 The	 quality	 of	 institutions	 that	 the	 experts	call	‘analog	complements’	significantly	impacts	the	outcomes	of	digital	technologies,	and	frequently	prevents	local	populations	from	fully	exploiting	the	benefits	of	information	&	communication	technologies	(World	Bank	2016b13).		The	 socio	 –	 economic	 landscape	 looks	 very	 much	 like	 the	 Schumpeterian	 phase	 of	‘prolonged	 depression’	 (Schumpeter	 193914).	 It	 is	 also	 quite	 close	 to	 the	 hypothetical	state	of	negative	return	on	investment,	as	described	by	John	Maynard	Keynes	in	Chapter	16	 of	 his	 ‘General	 Theory	 of	 Employment,	 Interest,	 and	 Money’,	 entitled	 ‘Sundry																																																									
9 These calculations were made on the grounds of Penn Tables 8.1, as introduced in: Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. 
Timmer (2015), "The Next Generation of the Penn World Table" forthcoming in American Economic Review, available for 
download at www.ggdc.net/pwt 
10 International Monetary Fund, World economic outlook October 2015, ISSN (online) 1564-5215, ISBN 978-1-51355-261-3 (PDF) 
11 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects January 2016, ISBN (electronic): 
978-1-4648-0676-6  
12 World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2015 
13 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, World Development Report 2016. Digital Dividens, e-
ISBN: 978-1-4648-0672-8 
14 Schumpeter, J.A., 1939, - BUSINESS CYCLES. A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process - New 
York Toronto London : McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939, 461 pp. Abridged, with an  introduction, by Rendigs Fels 
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Observations	on	the	Nature	of	Capital’.	Keynes	argued	 that	 in	such	a	situation	 the	state	should	 intervene	 in	 order	 to	 create	 a	 new	 allocation	 of	 capital.	 Schumpeter	demonstrated,	 with	 the	 example	 of	 economic	 developments	 observable	 in	 the	 19th	century,	 that	 governments	 can	 successfully	 leverage	 technological	 changes,	 but	 they	have	 to	 give	 away	 some	 of	 the	 sovereign	 power	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	 private	 business	structures	(Schumpeter	1939	op.cit.,	chapters	VI	–	VIII).			
The	theoretical	model	of	the	state		We	 are	 a	 learning	 species,	 and	 we	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 accumulate	 the	 outcomes	 of	learning	from	generation	to	generation,	although	that	accumulation	is	imperfect	(see for 
example: Selten 197515).	 As	 a	 species,	 humanity	 has	 collective	 intelligence	 through	interaction	 and	 experimentation,	 i.e.	 it	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	 generate	 new,	 functional	patterns	of	 collective	behaviour	by	 experimenting	with	 various	 strategies	 and	 sharing	information	about	their	outcomes.	If	two	armies	fight,	and	one	of	them	loses,	whilst	the	other	wins,	 the	 fact	of	 loss	and	victory	 is	 information,	which	 is	being	share	across	 the	society.	It	serves	to	organize	more	efficient	armies	in	the	future.		When	two	businesses	compete,	 they	display	various	capacity	of	acquire	capital,	 and	 to	assure	a	 return	on	 it.	The	 very	 fact	 of	 that	 variety	 is	 information,	 which	 is	 shared	 around	 and	 serves	 to	optimize	 future	business	patterns.	Thus,	 any	 social	 structure,	 the	mankind	as	 a	whole	included,	has	the	capacity	to	adapt	to	natural	(i.e.	non-social)	conditions,	and	any	such	structure,	government	included,	can	be	considered	as	one	more	step	in	learning	through	experimentation.	 Collective	 learning	 is	 a	 game	 with	 imperfect	 information	 with	 the	sharing	of	information:	each	set	of	institutions	is	an	experiment	with	finite	duration,	and	the	outcomes	of	that	experiment	feed	to	another	experiment.		A	sequence	of	consecutive	moves	in	the	game	is	needed	to	work	out	the	given	functional	pattern.	Many	sequences	can	be	practiced	in	parallel.	The	more	breakthrough	that	pattern	is	supposed	to	be,	the	greater	 is	 the	 uncertainty	 as	 for	 the	 number	 of	 moves	 in	 the	 sequence,	 and	 for	 the	number	of	parallel	sequences.		The	range	of	different	sets	of	institutions,	observable	at	a	given	 moment,	 is	 the	 measure	 of	 experimentation	 taking	 place.	 The	 more	 different																																																									
15 Selten, R., 1975, Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games - Journal International Journal of 
Game Theory, Issue Volume 4, Number 1, reprint: Kuhn, H.W.,( ed. ), Classics in Game Theory, Princeton University Press, 1997, pp. 317 – 
354 
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institutional	 patterns	 are	 there	 at	 the	 same	 moment,	 the	 more	 intense	 the	experimentation	 is.	 The	 greater	 intensity	 of	 experimentation	 at	 a	 given	 moment,	 the	greater	is	the	likelihood	of	working	out	new	functional	patterns	in	a	given	time.		Institutions	 can	 do	 only	 what	 people	 actually	 do.	 Institutions	 rely	 on	 legal	 rules,	combined	 with	 other	 types	 of	 social	 norms.	 All	 of	 these,	 in	 turn,	 come	 out	 from	 a	linguistically	 logical	 grasp	 of	 reality	 (Hodgson	 199316,	 200017,	 200618;	 Searle	 200519).	Consistently	with	Herbert	Hart’s	theory	of	law	(Hart	196120),	and	with	Talcott	Parsons’	sociological	theory	(Parsons	et	al.	196521),	social	norms	are	institutionalized	patterns	of	behaviour,	that	manifest	themselves	in	social	strategies	formed	and	used	by	individuals	and	 social	 groups,	 in	 a	 context	 of	 imperfect	 information	 (see	 for	 example:	 Harsanyi	195322;	196623;	196724;	196825).		Constitutional	 states	 are	 able	 to	 do	 things	 that	 they	 are	 allowed	 to	 do,	 and	 have	 the	material	 means	 to	 carry	 out.	 Thus,	 we	 are	 talking	 about	 equilibrium	 between	legitimation	and	economic	power,	in	the	government.	Institutions	emerge	in	a	discursive	process	 of	 legitimation	 for	 the	 given	 pattern	 of	 political	 action	 (see	 for	 example:	Habermas	 197526,	 197927,	 199628;	 Fraser	 199029).	 The	 political	 system	 itself	 has	 two	speeds.	On	the	one	hand,	political	action	provides	for	the	interests	of	major	social	groups	represented	 through	 current	 modification	 of	 institutions,	 and	 in	 that	 process	 the	government	appropriates	capital	in	order	to	carry	out	the	actual	public	mission	(see	for	example:	Weingast	et	al.	198130;	Weingast	199531).	The	capital	possible	to	appropriate	
																																																								
16 Hodgson, G.,M., 1993, Institutional Economics: Surveying the 'Old' and the 'New', Metroeconomica, vol. 44, no. 1 ( 
February), pp. 1 - 28 
17 Hodgson, G.,M., 2000, The Essence of Institutional Economics, Journal of Economic Issues, vol. XXXIV, no. 2, June, pp. 317 
- 329 
18 Hodgson, G.,M., 2006, Institutional Economics, the Individual Actor and Institutional Change, For the Alexander von 
Humboldt lecture at the University of Nijmegen, December the 5th, p. 1 
19 Searle, J., R., 2005, What is an Institution ?, Journal of Institutional Economics, vol. 1, pp.1-22 
20 Hart, H.L.A., 1961, The Concept of Law, 2nd edition, with a Postscript edited by Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz 
21 Parsons, Talcott, Edward Albert Shils, and Neil J. Smelser, eds. Toward a general theory of action: Theoretical 
foundations for the social sciences. Transaction Publishers, 1965. 
22 Harsanyi, J.C., 1953Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk – Taking – The Journal of Political 
Economy, 1953, vol. 61, issue 5, pp. 434 - 435 
23 Harsanyi,  J.C., 1966, A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations – Econometrica, 1966, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 
613 - 634 
24 Harsanyi,  J.C., 1967, Games With Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players. Part I: The Basic Model  – 
Management Science, 1967, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 159 - 182 
25 Harsanyi,  J.C., 1968, Games With Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points 
– Management Science, 1968, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 320 - 334 
26 Habermas, J., 1975, Legitimation Crisis, translated by T.McCarthy, Boston, 1975 
27 Habermas, J., 1979, Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by T.McCarthy, Boston 1979 
28 Habermas, J., 1996, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachussets, translated by William Rehg, Second Printing  
29 Fraser, N. 1990. Rethinking the Public Sphere. A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, Social Text, 
vol. 25/26: 56-80 
30 Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A., Johnsen, C. 1981. The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to 
Distributive Politics, The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 89(4): 642-664 
31 Weingast, B., 1995, The Economic Role of Political Institutions, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.11, #1, pp. 1 - 31 
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by	the	state	may	be	considered	as	a	rough	equivalent	of	territory,	with	respect	to	Max	Weber’s	 theory	 (see	 for	 example:	 Weingast	 198132).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 political	system	 itself	 has	 significant	 inertia,	 as	 distinct	 political	 players	 in	 the	 system	 have	 to	agree	for	the	action	to	take	(see	for	example:	Tsebelis	200233).	Hence,	institutions	adapt	imperfectly	 to	 their	 socio-economic	 and	 natural	 context	 (Andersen	 200434 ;	 Aoki	200735).		Any	constitutional	state	 in	place	can	be	described	with	two	types	of	rational	variables,	pertaining	to	the	two	fundamental	functions	of	the	state,	namely	appropriation	of	capital	and	creation	of	public	goods.	The	former	can	be	estimated	with	the	proportion	between	public	 expenditures,	 and	 the	 available	 capital	 stock,	 and	 the	 latter,	 consistently	 with	Braudel	(1983)	can	find	an	expression	in	the	proportion	between	demographic	growth	and	the	growth	of	public	expenditures.	Additionally,	in	the	initially	introduced	context	of	this	article	(coping	with	climate	change),	measures	of	correlation	between	technological	progress	 and	 public	 expenditures	 can	 be	 introduced	 as	 indirect	 indicators	 of	 public	goods	 created	 by	 state.	 The	 temporarily	 expected	 values	 of	 those	 indicators	 (e.g.	averages),	in	a	cross-sectional	approach,	set	the	central	trend	of	change	in	the	economic	role	 of	 the	 state.	 The	 temporary	 dispersion	 (e.g.	 variance,	 distance	 between	quartiles’	frontiers	etc.)	in	the	same	variables	can	help	to	estimate	the	temporary	diversity,	hence	the	intensity	of	experimentation	with	public	governance.				
Empirical	insight	–	the	general	landscape		The	 well-known	 statistical	 database	 of	 Penn	 Tables,	 in	 their	 8.x	 generation,	 recently	returned	 to	 measuring	 national	 capital	 stocks	 (see:	 Feenstra,	 Inklaar,	 Timmer	 2015).	That	 great	 source	of	 information,	 covering	 a	 relatively	 long	period,	 since	1950,	 seems	appropriate	to	sketch	the	empirical	landscape	for	this	article.	Graph	1,	in	the	Appendix,	shows	the	trends	of	indexed	values	in	two	variables:	the	total	capital	stock	in	the	global	economy,	 and	 the	 total	 public	 expenditures.	 The	 correlation	 seems	 almost	 perfect	 up	until	2002,	when	the	global	capital	stock	seems	to	gather	value	visibly	faster	than	global																																																									
32 Weingast, B. 1981. Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele 
Relationships, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol.44, No.1: 147 - 177 
33 Tsebelis, G. 2002. Veto players: How political institutions work, Princeton University Press 
34 Andersen, E., S., 2004, Population Thinking, Price’s Equation and the Analysis of Economic Evolution”, Evolutionary and 
Institutional Economics Review, vol. 1, no.1, November, pp. 127-48 
35 Aoki, M., 2007, Endogenizing Institutions and Institutional Changes, Stanford University, revised version of an invited 
lecture at the 2005World Congress of the International Economic Association in Morocco 
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public	expenditures.	On	the	other	hand,	both	aggregates	can	be	compared	to	each	other,	i.e.	 public	 expenditures	 can	 be	 computed	 as	 a	 share	 of	 the	 capital	 stock.	 Graph	 2	(Appendix)	 shows	 the	 1950	 –	 2011	 trend	 of	 that	 ratio,	 in	 two	 alternative	 versions:	aggregate	and	distributive	average.	Both	measures	seem	to	be	strongly	correlated	and	follow	 the	 same	 trends,	 with	 three	 distinct	 periods.	 From	 1950	 to	 the	 mid-1970s,	governments	appropriate	a	growing	share	of	the	capital	stock	accumulated.	That	period	roughly	corresponds	to	the	widespread	tendency	to	apply	Keynesian	economic	policy	in	the	developed	economies.	Between	the	mid-1970s	and	the	mid-1980s,	a	short	saddle	is	visible:	the	public	sector	first	recedes,	then	advances.	These	are	the	first	years	of	fashion	for	 monetarism	 in	 economic	 policy.	 After	 1985,	 when	 the	 so-called	 NCM	 model	 of	economic	 governance	 starts	 to	 take	 root,	 the	 trend	 is	 clearly	 descending:	 the	 capital	stock	accumulates	much	faster	than	public	sectors	grow	(see:	Taylor	201136).			It	is	interesting	to	descend	at	the	level	of	cross-sectional	comparison	between	countries,	and	Table	2	(Appendix)	shows	the	average	national	ratios	over	1950	-	2011.	A	pattern	clearly	comes	out:	the	wealthier	the	country,	and	the	bigger	its	economy,	the	lower	that	average,	 national	 ratio.	 The	 share	 of	 public	 expenditures	 in	 the	 national	 capital	 stock	seems	to	target	some	kind	of	ceiling	value,	and	not	going	above	 it.	 In	other	words,	 the	public	sector	can	appropriate	a	part	of	the	total	capital	stock	up	to	a	point,	and	past	that	point	 capital	 accumulates	 in	 the	 private	 sector	much	 faster	 than	 in	 the	 public	 one.	 It	seems	to	be	a	case	of	target	fiscal	stance,	according	to	the	general	concept	formulated	by	Roubini	and	Sachs	(1989).	Formal	econometric	analysis	 in	the	data	panel	consisting	of	Penn	 Tables	 8_1	 yields	 allows	 a	 multiple,	 linear	 regression,	 explaining	 the	 share	 of	public	 expenditures	 in	 the	 national	 capital	 stock	 with	 three	 input	 variables:	 GDP	 per	capita,	total	GDP,	and	population	(See	Table	1,	Appendix).	With	N	=	8278	observations,	that	regression	yields	a	linear	equation	with	pretty	good	econometric	fit	(R2	=	0,465,	all	coefficients	 significant	 at	 p	 <	 0,001).	 The	 relative	 size	 of	 the	 national	 economy	 as	measured	 by	 the	 GDP	 seems	 to	 discourage	 the	 appropriation	 of	 capital	 by	 the	 public	sector.	 The	 bigger	 grows	 the	 output	 of	 the	 economy;	 the	 lower	 descends	 the	appropriation	of	capital	by	the	government.		On	the	other	hand,	the	demographic	size	of	the	country,	and	its	relative	wealth	measured	with	GDP	per	capita	both	push	the	public	appropriation	of	capital	upwards.		
																																																								
36 Taylor, C., 2011, A Macroeconomic Regime for The 21st Century. Towards a new economic order – Routledge, Taylor & Francis, London 
and New York, ISBN 978-0-415-59898-9, pp.13 - 81 
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Graph	3	(Appendix)	shows	the	relative	dispersion	in	the	ratio	of	public	expenditures	to	the	national	 capital	 stock,	 as	 the	 spread	between	 the	1st	 and	 the	99th	 percentile,	 from	1950	 through	 2011.	 Between	 1950	 and	 1976,	 the	 spread	 had	 been	 growing	 sharply:	there	 had	 been	 more	 and	 more	 experimentation	 as	 for	 the	 actual	 capacity	 of	governments	 to	 appropriate	 capital.	 After	 1976,	 the	 trend	 reversed,	 and	 since	 then	dispersion	 has	 been	 decreasing,	 which	 suggests	 a	 lowering	 tendency	 to	experimentation.	A	pattern	emerges:	the	observable	growth	or	decline	in	public	appropriation	of	capital	is	clearly	 correlated	with	 the	degree	of	 experimentation	with	 said	 appropriation.	 In	 that	process	of	experimenting,	countries	from	the	upper	percentiles	visibly	hit	a	ceiling,	and	bounced	back.	That	ceiling	seems	to	have	been	situated	somewhere	between	18%	and	20%	of	the	national	capital	stock	‘vacuum	cleaned’	through	public	budgets,	or,	in	terms	of	cross-sectional	distribution,	somewhere	around	1,4	percentage	point	above	the	least	appropriating	governments.					The	most	fundamental	demographic	change	is	the	change	in	size.	Hence,	the	next	step	in	our	 investigation	 is	 the	 basic	 comparison	 of	 trends	 in,	 respectively,	 population	 and	aggregate	 public	 expenditures	 at	 the	 global	 scale.	 Graph	 4	 (Appendix)	 shows	 those	trends	 as	 1990-based	 indexed	 values,	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 Penn	 Tables	 8.1.	 From	 1950	until	 the	 mid-1990s	 those	 two	 indexes	 had	 been	 following	 a	 very	 similar	 trajectory.	After	 1996,	 global	 public	 expenditures	 started	 to	 grow	 significantly	 faster.	 Graph	 5	(Appendix)	gives	an	 idea	of	dispersion	public	expenditures	per	capita,	as	measured	 in	constant	2005	US$.	Three	periods	can	be	distinguished.	From	1950	to	1978,	the	spread	between	the	1st	and	the	99th	percentile	of	that	variable	had	been	quickly	growing,	up	to	some	15	000	constant	2005	US$.	After	1978,	through	2006,	a	period	of	quick	changes	in	dispersion	followed,	as	 if	some	governments	had	recurrently	attempted	to	break	some	kind	of	frontier,	with	changing	success.	After	2006,	dispersion	restarted	to	increase.					One	measure	has	been	chosen	in	the	present	article	to	appraise	the	overall	technological	progress	of	humanity:	agricultural	productivity.	Innovation	is	commonly	associated	with	the	most	advanced	 technologies,	 and	agriculture	does	not	 really	 fit	 the	bill.	Yet,	 as	we	study	 the	 diffusion	 of	 innovation	 as	 a	 process	 of	 spill-over,	 from	 the	 most	 advanced	fields	of	technology,	down	to	the	most	day	to	day	activities,	agriculture	is	somewhere	at	the	 bottom	 of	 that	 fountain	 of	 new	 ideas.	 Farming	 is	 tough,	 and	 it	 requires	 all	 the	necessary	 skills	 and	 resources	 to	 be	 grouped	 in	 one	 place,	 i.e.	 at	 the	 farm.	 When	
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technological	 advances	 arrive	 to	 the	 agricultural	 sector,	 they	 must	 have	 been	preliminarily,	 fully	 absorbed	 in	 the	 social	 structure.	 Agricultural	 productivity	encompasses	 energy	 use	 as	 well,	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 ability	 to	 save	 energy.	Agriculture	 consumes	 energy,	 both	 directly,	 and	 indirectly,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 fossil	 fuels,	electricity,	 and	 embodied	 in	 intermediate	 goods.	Agriculture	 yields	 rather	 a	 low	value	added,	 and	every	penny	 counts	when	 it	 comes	 to	 counting	 the	 costs.	 Saving	 energy	 is	important	 to	 any	 farmer.	 Thus,	 agricultural	 productivity	 is	 a	 measure	 of	 energy	efficiency	 in	human	activities,	 as	well.	Graph	6,	 in	 the	Appendix,	 shows	 the	previously	introduced	 share	 of	 global	 public	 expenditures	 in	 the	 global	 capital	 stock,	 against	 the	trend	in	cereal	yield	(kg/ha),	as	published	by	the	World	Bank.	Both	measures	are	shown	as	trends	indexed	on	the	constant	basis	of	1990	values.	Up	until	the	early	1990s,	those	trends	 seem	 to	 have	 been	 strongly	 correlated.	 Since	 then,	 the	 correlation	 has	 broken,	and	agricultural	productivity	has	been	growing	despite	the	shrinking	participation	of	the	public	 sector	 in	 the	 available	 capital	 stock.	 Graph	 7,	 in	 the	 Appendix,	 completes	 the	picture	by	showing	the	relative	dispersion	over	time,	in	agricultural	productivity,	as	the	spread	between	the	4th	and	the	1st	quartile.	Interestingly,	up	until	2006	that	spread	had	been	increasing	very	gently:	the	most	productive	countries	were	quite	close	to	the	least	productive	ones.	After	2006,	some	kind	of	 technological	revolution	took	place,	and	the	upper	quartile	rocketed	up,	leaving	far	behind	the	followers.					The	economic	role	of	constitutional	states	has	certainly	evolved.	It	is	interesting	to	put	that	economic	change	against	the	background	of	political	institutions.	In	that	respect,	the	Database	 of	 Political	 Institutions,	 (DPI),	 as	 published	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	 (Beck	 et	 al	200137;	 Keefer	 201238)	 provides	 some	 interesting	 observations	 as	 for	 the	 intriguing	period	since	1975.	Following	Tsebelis	(2002	op.	cit.)	it	is	assumed	that	political	systems	have	two	intertwined	structures:	the	constitutional,	and	the	partisan	one.	At	the	strictly	constitutional	 level,	 the	 DPI	 distinguishes	 three	 basic	 systems:	 parliamentary,	presidential,	 and	 those	with	 assembly	 –	 elected	presidents.	 In	 the	 same	 constitutional	perspective,	 the	DPI	provides	two	variables,	namely	 ‘LIEC’	and	 ‘EIEC’,	which	are	rough	estimates	 as	 for	 the	 degree	 of	 democracy	 in	 the	 appointment	 of	 respectively	 the	legislative,	and	the	executive	bodies.	The	higher	the	value	of	‘LIEC’	or	‘EIEC’	index,	on	a	scale	 from	1	to	7,	 the	greater	 the	probability	 that	democratic	standards	are	respected.																																																									
37 Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., Walsh, P. 2001. New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of 
Political Institutions, The World Bank Economic Review, vol. 15, no. 1: 165–176 
38 Keefer, P. 2012. Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Definitions, Development Research Group The 
World Bank, December 2012 
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Since	1975,	the	DPI	displays	a	growing	average	value	in	both	indexes,	and	a	decreasing	variance.	As	 rough	as	 the	 sketch	 is,	 constitutional	 states	 seem	 to	have	been	becoming	consistently	 more	 and	 more	 democratic,	 and	 the	 degree	 of	 experimentation	 in	 that	respect	clearly	declined.	The	‘POLARIZ’	variable	in	the	DPI	shows	the	degree	of	partisan	polarization	 in	 political	 systems,	 with	 respect	 to	 economic	 policy.	 The	 scale	 of	polarization	is	highly	discreet,	ranging	from	‘0’	(no	observable	polarization),	through	‘1’	(moderate),	to	‘2’	(high).	It	is	to	notice,	in	the	first	place	that	the	‘0s’	keep	on	prevailing	in	 the	DPI.	Most	political	systems	 in	 the	world,	currently	109	out	of	 the	145	reported,	display	no	substantial	partisan	divergence	in	the	matters	of	economic	policy.	Yet,	since	1975,	 the	 share	 of	 ‘1s’	 and	 ‘2s’	 has	 increased.	 As	 astounding	 as	 it	 could	 seem,	 most	flamboyant	debates	 about	 economic	policy,	 observable	 in	national	 assemblies	 and	 the	media,	most	frequently	boil	down	to	quite	amorphous	economic	programs.			It	 is	 interesting	 to	 confront	 the	 data	 about	 political	 institutions	 with	 the	 relatively	current	 fiscal	 developments,	 as	 reported	 by	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 in	 its	World	Economic	Outlook	database	(WEO),	as	published	in	April	2015.	The	DPI	and	the	WEO	put	 together	 cover	 the	period	between	1980	and	2012,	 and	allow	an	 interesting	insight	 into	 current	 the	 typical	 fiscal	 stance	 in	 typical	 political	 frames.	 In	 order	 to	represent	the	basic	constitutional	structure	of	political	systems,	two	variables	have	been	selected	in	the	rich	structure	of	the	Database	of	Political	Systems.	The	first	is	the	type	of	political	system	according	to	the	presence	and	powers	of	the	president,	coded	in	the	DPI	as	 ‘system’.	 The	 second	 is	 the	 type	 of	 electoral	 competitiveness	 in	 parliamentary	elections,	covered	by	the	variables	‘plurality’,	and	‘proportionality’	in	the	DPI.		The	 distinction	 between	 presidential	 systems,	 and	 the	 parliamentary	 ones	 takes	 into	account	two	main	categories	of	veto	players:	institutional,	and	partisan.	In	other	words,	veto	players	can	emerge	and	change	their	relative	impact	upon	the	system	following	to	patterns:	 the	 regulatory,	 constitutional	 definition	 of	 their	 role,	 and	 the	 discretionary	freedom	of	political	action	offered	by	that	role.	In	presidential	systems,	the	president	is	a	strong	 veto	 player,	 and	 tends	 to	 concentrate	 power	 in	 their	 hands.	 Conversely,	parliamentary	systems	are	based	on	diversified	and	dispersed	political	power,	without	that	 one	 central	 veto	player	 in	 the	presidential	 seat.	 Systems	with	 assembly	 –	 elected	presidents	are	an	interesting	hybrid	of	the	two,	probably	prone	to	balance	towards	the	concentration,	or	the	dispersion	of	political	power,	following	the	personal	talents	of	the	president	in	place.			
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The	general	assumption	 is	 that	regimes	with	a	strong	component	of	electoral	plurality	favour	“winner-takes-it-all”	elections.	This,	in	turn,	promotes	the	interests	of	big,	strong	political	 parties,	 making	 them	 strong	 veto	 players,	 and	 reduces	 the	 veto	 playing	positions	 of	 small	 parties.	 In	 other	words,	 plural	 electoral	 regimes	 tend	 to	 reduce	 the	overall	number	of	partisan	veto	players,	but	they	confer	important	impact	to	the	players	who	manage	to	enter	the	scene.	On	the	other	hand,	proportionality	in	elections	allows	a	broader	representation	of	small	political	parties	and	non-partisan	representatives	in	the	legislative	body.	That	creates	more	veto	players	with	more	disparate	political	power.		As	for	the	partisan	structure	of	the	political	system,	the	most	general	variable	in	the	DPI	seems	 to	be	political	polarization,	 already	mentioned.	The	detailed	composition	of	 the	sample	 of	 observations	 studied	 is	 given	 in	 the	 Appendix	 (Table	 3).	 Just	 as	 in	 the	 full	contents	 of	 the	 DPI,	 the	 sample	 studied	 is	 dominated	 by	 three	 big	 clusters:	 plural	electoral	 regimes	 in	 presidential	 systems	 with	 no	 observable	 polarization	 (N	 =	 233	observations),	 plural	 electoral	 regimes	 in	 parliamentary	 systems,	 with	 no	 observable	polarization	 as	 well	 (N	 =	 205),	 and	 strongly	 polarized,	 parliamentary	 systems	 with	proportional	elections	(N	=	213).	This	clustering	suggests	that	plural	electoral	regimes	favour	the	formation	of	partisan	structures	around	groups	of	interest	rather	that	around	ideological	 stances.	 That	 appears	 as	 a	 logical	 consequence	 of	 the	 “winner-takes-it-all”	principle	 in	 plural	 elections,	which	 favours	 big	 electoral	 funds	 and	 robust	 campaigns,	and	 clearly	 discourages	 ideological	 discords.	 An	 interesting	 pattern	 emerges:	 national	political	 systems	 tend	 to	 stay	 quite	 firmly	within	 one	 pattern	 of	 constitutional	 order,	over	 the	 period	 of	 observation,	 yet	 they	 frequently	 move	 between	 various	 cases	 of	partisan	polarization.		The	 next	 step	 of	 empirical	 investigation	was	 to	 follow	 the	 disparities	 of	 typical	 fiscal	aggregates	 across	 political	 systems.	 Fiscal	 aggregates	 have	 been	 divided	 into	 two	categories,	 namely	 current	 and	 capital,	 following	 the	 basic	 intuitions	 of	 the	 present	research.	 The	 structural	 fiscal	 balance,	 gross	 public	 revenues,	 and	 gross	 public	expenditures	 are	 classified	 as	 current	 aggregates,	 i.e.	 rather	 flows	 than	 balances.	Conversely,	gross	and	net	public	debt	is	considered	as	capital	measures	(balances	rather	than	flows).	The	differential	between	gross	and	net	debt,	namely	the	amount	of	financial	assets	held	by	the	public	sector,	is	included	in	this	category	too39.			
																																																								
39 The author is aware of the conceptual risk connected to that variable. Those financial assets include, for a large part, those held by central 
banks as monetary reserves. Thus, this could be a monetary variable rather that a fiscal one. Yet, the amount of those financial assets in 
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As	 for	 gross	 public	 revenues,	 parliamentary	 systems	 are	 clearly	 tax-greedier	 than	 the	presidential	ones	(Table	4,	Appendix).	They	also	seem	much	more	sensitive	to	political	polarization:	 any	 increase	 in	 that	 respect	 is	 connected	 to	 significantly	 higher	 public	revenues.	 Gross	 public	 expenditures	 follow	 a	 similar	 pattern,	 and	 yet,	 within	 each	constitutional	order,	they	seem	much	more	sensitive	than	revenues	to	shifts	in	political	polarization.	The	observation	of	structural	fiscal	balances	seems	to	indicate	that	the	shift	from	 no	 observable	 polarization	 to	 moderate	 one	 has	 more	 impact	 than	 a	 further	deepening	of	polarization	from	moderate	to	high.		Variables	referring	to	capital	accruals	in	the	public	sector	display	a	significantly	greater	disparity	across	political	systems	than	current	flows	do.	In	other	words,	the	empirically	observable	 differences	 between	 political	 systems	 as	 for	 their	 patterns	 of	 capital	appropriation	 are	 noticeably	 more	 pronounced	 than	 differences	 referring	 to	 current	fiscal	management	(Table	5,	Appendix).		Following	 the	 observable	 clustering	 of	 political	 systems	 in	 the	 sample	 studied,	 three	“big”	types	are	defined	for	the	purposes	of	further	empirical	investigation.	They	are:	a) Cluster	 #1:	 Presidential	 systems	 with	 plural	 elections,	 and	 no	 observable	political	 polarization:	 structural	 balance	 	 -2,651%	 of	 GDP,	 gross	 public	indebtedness	 55,186%	 of	 the	 GDP,	 financial	 assets	 held	 by	 the	 public	 sector	9,151%	of	the	GDP		b) Cluster	 #2:	 Parliamentary	 systems	 with	 plural	 elections,	 and	 no	 observable	political	 polarization:	 structural	 balance	 	 -3,643%	 of	 GDP,	 gross	 public	indebtedness	 70,739%	 of	 the	 GDP,	 financial	 assets	 held	 by	 the	 public	 sector	23,165%	of	the	GDP	c) Cluster	#3:	Parliamentary	systems	with	proportional	elections	and	high	political	polarization:	 structural	 balance	 	 -3,089%	 of	 GDP,	 gross	 public	 indebtedness	62,025%	of	 the	 GDP,	 financial	 assets	 held	 by	 the	 public	 sector	 46,771%	of	 the	GDP					The	definition	of	 those	3	 clusters	 shows	 even	more	 sharply	 the	 explanatory	power	of	capital	 appropriation	 as	 a	 characteristic	 of	 political	 systems.	 The	 interesting,	 general	observation	is	that	cluster	#1,	which	hosts	the	least	veto	players	in	the	system,	seems	to	be	the	most	frugal	in	fiscal	terms,	both	with	respect	to	current	fiscal	management,	and	to	
																																																																																																																																																																													
public hands is not exclusively monetary, in the first place, and, secondly, it impacts significantly the fiscal, borrowing capacity of the 
government. Hence, this is a variable at the fringe of fiscal policy, and the rest of the economy.  
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capital	 appropriation.	 Any	 shift	 from	 this	 cluster,	 thus	 any	 addition	 of	 veto	 players,	through	 constitutional	 rules	 or	 partisan	 polarization,	 is	 clearly	 associated	 to	 more	profusion	 in	 fiscal	 stances.	 Considering	 constitutional	 and	 partisan	 distinctions	 as	 an	overall	 indicator	of	the	number	of	veto	players	in	the	system,	we	can	roughly	consider	clusters	#1,	and	#3	as	the	opposite	poles	of	the	scale,	with	cluster	#2	found	somewhere	in	the	middle.	Cluster	#1	has	probably	the	least	veto	players,	cluster	#3	has	the	most	of	them,	and	cluster	#2	 is	 a	medium	case.	Following	 this	 intuition,	 the	presence	of	more	veto	players	in	the	political	system	is	associated	most	of	all	to	a	much	greater	tendency	of	the	public	sector	to	accumulate	liquid	financial	assets.	
Final	discussion		The	 most	 general	 conclusion	 coming	 from	 the	 empirical	 investigation	 is	 that	constitutional	 states,	 as	 a	 distinct	 category	 of	 social	 structures,	 are	 becoming	 simpler	and	more	 recurrent	 in	 their	 internal,	 political	mechanics.	 Constitutional	 states	 do	 not	really	 experiment	 a	 lot	 with	 themselves.	 It	 seems	 that	 whole	 societies	 clearly	 prefer	bespoke	 to	 tailor	made,	as	political	 systems	come.	We	the	humans	clearly	prefer	well-rounded,	 ready-made	 patterns	 of	 collective	 organisation	 to	 uncertain	 outcomes	 of	experimentation.	 It	 had	 not	 always	 been	 so.	 Between	 1950	 and	 1980,	 constitutional	states	 seem	 to	 have	 gone	 through	 a	 period	 of	 intense	 experimentation,	 chiefly	 on	 the	tide	 of	 decolonisation	 and	 development	 of	 international	 organisations.	 Observation	 of	long	 term	 trends	 suggest	 that	 it	was	 precisely	 that	 period	 of	 intense	 experimentation	that	 brought	 a	 temporary	 expansion	 of	 constitutional	 states	 in	 their	 economic	 power,	thus	 in	 their	 capacity	 to	 implement	 any	 significant	 technological	 progress.	 When	political	 experimentation	 started	 to	 turn	 into	 increased	 repetition	 of	 already	 known	patterns,	 constitutional	 states	 progressively	 lost	 their	 grip	 upon	 the	 capital	 stock	available.	The	 relative	position	of	national	 governments	as	economic	players,	 vis	 a	vis	other	 types	 of	 social	 agents,	 seems	 to	 have	 settled	 as	much	weaker	 than	 in	 the	 1990.	Constitutional	states,	as	a	distinct	category	of	social	structures,	are	generally	successful	as	 guarantors	 as	 for	 the	 enforceability	 of	 claims	 and	 property	 rights.	 Yet,	 the	 same	constitutional	 states	 generally	 failed	 to	 accumulate	 substantial	 capital	 on	 their	 own	account.	 With	 rare	 exceptions	 of	 important	 state	 owned	 assets	 (e.g.	 Canada,	 Russia,	Finland	etc.),	most	governments	can	only	achieve	temporary	retention	of	capital	through	
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a	 pattern	 of	 governance	 known	 as	 ‘budgetary	 slack’	 (see	 for	 example:	 Goldman,	Brashares	199140).	For	the	last	two	decades,	capital	seems	to	accumulate	chiefly	outside	the	public	sector.	National	economies	experiment	less	and	less,	too,	with	the	capacity	of	the	state	 to	appropriate	capital.	On	 the	other	hand,	experimentation	does	go	on	as	 for	the	 correspondence	 between	 public	 expenditures	 and	 population.	 Global	 public	expenditures	are	growing	faster	than	the	number	of	people	to	spend	money	on,	and	that	discrepancy	is	to	notice	since	the	1990s.	Public	expenditures	per	capita,	computed	at	the	national	level,	display	a	growing	cross-sectional	dispersion.	Some	countries	still	attempt	at	 maintaining	 the	 welfare	 state,	 but	 those	 attempts	 are	 becoming	 more	 and	 more	isolated	in	comparison	to	the	global	average.		Constitutional	 states	 are	 progressively	 becoming	 superfluous	 in	 promoting	technological	 progress.	 The	 latter	 seems	 to	 follow	 logically	 from	 the	 former:	 public	expenditures	disconnect	 from	 technological	progress	because	 there	 is	more	 and	more	capital	available	outside	the	budgetary	cycle	of	governments.		The	state,	as	a	type	of	social	structure,	develops	on	a	rising	tide	of	demographic	growth.	At	 first,	 in	 that	process,	public	 institutions	are	really	 functional	regarding	the	needs	of	the	growing	population.	Yet,	the	appropriation	of	capital	by	public	agents	progressively	becomes	 autonomous	 regarding	 the	 strictly	 spoken	 demographic	 needs.	 The	phenomenon	 of	 ‘pervasive	 state’	 appears:	 appropriation	 of	 capital	 by	 public	 agents	starts	 to	 be	 dysfunctional	 and	 self-propelled.	 The	 state	 progressively	 stops	 to	redistribute	capital,	and	starts	creating	undistributed	pockets	of	capital	with	uncertain	property	 rights,	 subject	 to	discretionary	power	of	politicians.	Marginal	productivity	of	capital	 suffers,	probably	because	of	 the	rising	 inflation	and	growing	uncertainty	as	 for	the	interest	rates.		The	 state,	 as	 a	 functional	 social	 structure,	 builds	 up	 to	 a	 point,	mostly	 determined	by	demographic	 factors.	 Past	 that	 point,	 the	 frontier	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 private	sector	becomes	 foggy.	 Institutions	build	up	at	 the	 frontier	between	 the	public	and	 the	private,	and	they	accumulate	capital	characterized	by	uncertain	property	rights.	Those	institutions	become	dysfunctional,	as	they	de	facto	divert	capital	 from	both	productive	employment	 and	 social	 redistribution.	 This	 is	 the	 intuition	 expressed	 by	 many	economists	regarding	the	accumulation	of	public	debt	(see	for	example:	Meade	195841;																																																									
40 Goldman, F., E. Brashares. 1991. Performance and Accountability: Budget Reform in New Zealand, Public Budgeting and 
Finance, vol.11(4): 75­85 
41 Meade, J.,E., 1958, Is the National Debt a Burden, Oxford Economic Papers, Volume 10, Issue 2 (Jun., 1958), pp. 126 - 150 
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Modigliani	196142;	Diamond	196543).	A	point	comes	when	the	dysfunction	of	those	foggy	public	 institutions	 becomes	 so	 pronounced	 that	 the	 state	 loses	 its	 capacity	 to	appropriate	capital,	and	de	facto	backs	off	as	a	social	agent.			Now,	 let’s	 return	 to	 the	 initial	question	of	 this	article:	 are	constitutional	 states	able	 to	assure	the	pivotal	role	in	driving	the	mankind	through	the	perils	of	climate	change,	as	it	is	assumed	in	the	Paris	Framework	Climate	Agreement,	2015?	The	answer	is:	probably	not,	 at	 least	 not	 now.	 Of	 course,	 constitutional	 states	 are	 able	 to	 experiment	 with	themselves.	Both	the	historical	accounts,	and	the	more	recent	trends	prove	that.	Yet,	the	latest	 wave	 of	 experimentation,	 from	 the	 1950s	 through	 the	 1980s,	 required	 a	prerequisite	 of	 two	 consecutive	 world	 wars.	 Constitutional	 states	 seem	 to	 be	institutionally	rigid,	once	they	have	settled	into	some	precise	form.													 	
																																																								
42 Modigliani, F., 1961, Long-Run Implications of Alternative Fiscal Policies And the Burden of the National Debt, Economic 
Journal, no. 71, pp. 730 - 755 
43 Diamond, P., E., 1965, National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model, The American Economic Review, volume 55, issue 5 
(Dec., 1965), pp. 1126 - 1150 
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Appendix			
Table	1	
Explained	 variable:	 ln(1	 +	 share	 of	 public	 expenditures	 in	 the	 national	 capital	 stock),	 linear	 OLS	
regression	
N	=	8278	
R2	=	0,465	
Explanatory	variable	 Coefficient	 Standard	error	 t-statistic	 p-value	ln(1	+	GDP	per	capita)	 0,089	 0,004	 23,159	 0,000	ln(1	+	GDP)	 -0,084	 0,004	 -20,092	 0,000	ln(1	+	population)	 0,101	 0,005	 20,057	 0,000	
Source:	author’s,	on	the	grounds	of	data	from	Penn	Tables	8.1.,	Feenstra,	Inklaar	and	Timmer	(2015)		
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Graph	2	
	
Source:	Penn	Tables	8.1.,	Feenstra,	Inklaar	and	Timmer	(2015)		
Table	2	
country	 Average	share	of	public	
expenditures	in	the	
national	capital	stock	
over	1950	-	2011	
country	 Average	share	of	public	
expenditures	in	the	
national	capital	stock	
over	1950	-	2011	
country	 Average	share	of	public	
expenditures	in	the	
national	capital	stock	
over	1950	-	2011	Albania	 5,9%	 Finland	 4,6%	 Oman	 10,3%	Angola	 17,9%	 France	 5,9%	 Pakistan	 10,4%	Antigua	and	Barbuda	 38,9%	 Gabon	 7,6%	 Panama	 11,0%	Argentina	 4,0%	 Gambia	 15,9%	 Paraguay	 9,7%	Armenia	 8,1%	 Georgia	 11,5%	 Peru	 8,2%	Australia	 3,9%	 Germany	 4,6%	 Philippines	 8,7%	Austria	 7,0%	 Ghana	 4,4%	 Poland	 9,5%	Azerbaijan	 11,3%	 Greece	 4,6%	 Portugal	 5,9%	Bahamas	 12,1%	 Grenada	 31,1%	 Qatar	 10,0%	Bahrain	 8,8%	 Guatemala	 9,9%	 Republic	 of	Korea	 5,8%	Bangladesh	 6,9%	 Guinea	 8,5%	 Republic	 of	Moldova	 7,3%	Barbados	 13,5%	 Guinea-Bissau	 5,7%	 Romania	 11,0%	Belarus	 7,8%	 Honduras	 7,3%	 Russian	Federation	 6,3%	Belgium	 5,6%	 Hungary	 10,4%	 Rwanda	 49,4%	Belize	 39,9%	 Iceland	 4,9%	 Saint	 Kitts	and	Nevis	 16,3%	Benin	 25,2%	 India	 8,2%	 Saint	Lucia	 37,7%	
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Bermuda	 29,1%	 Indonesia	 8,4%	 Sao	 Tome	and	Principe	 7,5%	Bhutan	 8,2%	 Iran	(Islamic	Republic	of)	
5,9%	 Saudi	Arabia	 5,8%	
Bolivia	 8,9%	 Iraq	 10,4%	 Senegal	 11,6%	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	
16,0%	 Ireland	 7,2%	 Serbia	 7,1%	
Botswana	 14,4%	 Israel	 16,6%	 Sierra	Leone	 59,7%	Brazil	 6,4%	 Italy	 5,1%	 Singapore	 6,1%	Brunei	Darussalam	 10,5%	 Jamaica	 8,0%	 Slovakia	 9,4%	Bulgaria	 11,5%	 Japan	 7,8%	 Slovenia	 6,2%	Burkina	Faso	 12,1%	 Jordan	 29,4%	 South	Africa	 8,0%	Burundi	 9,8%	 Kazakhstan	 6,7%	 Spain	 5,0%	Cambodia	 4,9%	 Kenya	 11,3%	 Sri	Lanka	 14,9%	Cameroon	 13,0%	 Kuwait	 9,4%	 St.	 Vincent	and	 the	Grenadines	 44,4%	Canada	 5,4%	 Kyrgyzstan	 14,3%	 Sudan	 21,8%	Cape	Verde	 4,7%	 Lao	People's	Democratic	Republic	
10,1%	 Suriname	 8,2%	
Central	African	Republic	 6,9%	 Latvia	 10,2%	 Swaziland	 13,8%	Chad	 100,1%	 Lebanon	 6,2%	 Sweden	 9,4%	Chile	 11,7%	 Lesotho	 9,5%	 Switzerland	 2,4%	China,	People's	Republic	of	
14,1%	 Liberia	 4,9%	 Syrian	 Arab	Republic	 16,6%	
China:	Hong	Kong	SAR	 2,9%	 Lithuania	 14,8%	 Taiwan	 22,4%	China:	Macao	SAR	 4,6%	 Luxembourg	 4,4%	 Tajikistan	 10,7%	Colombia	 3,6%	 Madagascar	 16,9%	 Thailand	 7,6%	Comoros	 12,9%	 Malawi	 7,6%	 The	 Former	Yugoslav	Republic	 of	Macedonia	
9,6%	
Congo	 31,2%	 Malaysia	 5,8%	 Togo	 8,4%	Costa	Rica	 11,1%	 Maldives	 16,9%	 Trinidad	 and	Tobago	 10,5%	Croatia	 7,1%	 Mali	 29,0%	 Tunisia	 13,5%	Cyprus	 3,3%	 Malta	 9,7%	 Turkey	 5,3%	Czech	Republic	 8,7%	 Mauritania	 12,7%	 Turkmenistan	 7,9%	Côte	d'Ivoire	 16,2%	 Mauritius	 15,0%	 Uganda	 14,0%	Democratic	Republic	of	 the	Congo	
5,0%	 Mexico	 4,3%	 Ukraine	 4,8%	
Are	constitutional	states	able	to	drive	the	global	technological	change?	
	 24	
Denmark	 6,5%	 Mongolia	 12,2%	 United	Kingdom	 7,6%	Djibouti	 16,4%	 Montenegro	 10,2%	 United	Republic	 of	Tanzania:	Mainland	
26,5%	
Dominica	 91,9%	 Morocco	 18,5%	 United	States	 4,6%	Dominican	Republic	 7,6%	 Mozambique	 5,4%	 Uruguay	 9,1%	Ecuador	 7,7%	 Namibia	 9,2%	 Uzbekistan	 35,0%	Egypt	 69,9%	 Nepal	 17,5%	 Venezuela	 8,4%	El	Salvador	 25,1%	 Netherlands	 6,4%	 Viet	Nam	 13,9%	Equatorial	Guinea	 82,0%	 New	Zealand	 7,4%	 Yemen	 38,0%	Estonia	 12,1%	 Niger	 6,2%	 Zambia	 24,2%	Ethiopia	 19,9%	 Nigeria	 14,1%	 Zimbabwe	 42,8%	Fiji	 13,0%	 Norway	 5,8%	 	 	
Source:	Penn	Tables	8.1.,	Feenstra,	Inklaar	and	Timmer	(2015)			
Graph	3		
	Source:	Penn	Tables	8.1.,	Feenstra,	Inklaar	and	Timmer	(2015)		
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Graph	4	
	
	Source:	Penn	Tables	8.1.,	Feenstra,	Inklaar	and	Timmer	(2015)		
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Source:	Penn	Tables	8.1.,	Feenstra,	Inklaar	and	Timmer	(2015)							
0	
0,5	
1	
1,5	
2	
2,5	
1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	
Index	1990	=	1,00	Total	global	public	expenditures	
Index	1990	=	1,00	Total	global	popula?on	
	0,000	
2	000,000	
4	000,000	
6	000,000	
8	000,000	
10	000,000	
12	000,000	
14	000,000	
16	000,000	
18	000,000	
19
50
	
19
52
	
19
54
	
19
56
	
19
58
	
19
60
	
19
62
	
19
64
	
19
66
	
19
68
	
19
70
	
19
72
	
19
74
	
19
76
	
19
78
	
19
80
	
19
82
	
19
84
	
19
86
	
19
88
	
19
90
	
19
92
	
19
94
	
19
96
	
19
98
	
20
00
	
20
02
	
20
04
	
20
06
	
20
08
	
20
10
	
Dispersion	public	expenditures	per	capita	(99th	percen5le	minus	1st	
percen5le),	constant	2005	US$	
Are	constitutional	states	able	to	drive	the	global	technological	change?	
	 26	
Graph	6	
	
Source:	Penn	Tables	8.1.,	Feenstra,	Inklaar	and	Timmer	(2015),	World	Bank	Database	of	Social	Development	
Indicators		
Graph	7	
	
Source:	Penn	Tables	8.1.,	Feenstra,	Inklaar	and	Timmer	(2015),	World	Bank	Database	of	Social	Development	
Indicators				
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Table	3		 Political	system	
Electoral	
regime	
Presidential	 Assembly	–	
Elected	
President	
Parliamentary	
Plural	
elections	
POLARIZ	=	0	
N	=	233	
Bahrain	2003	–	2012;	Bolivia	2006	–	2012;	
Chile	2002	–	2009;	Egypt	2006	–	2011;	Ghana	
2005	–	2001;	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran	1996	–	
2012;	Jordan	1990	–	2009;	Kazakhstan	2009	–	
2007;	Kenya	1998	–	2007;	Korea	2005	–	2012;	
Lithuania	2000,	2004;	Malawi	2005	–	2012;	
Maldives	1997	–	2009;	Mali	2000	–	2002;	
Mexico	1998	–	2000;	Morocco	1996	–	2012;	
Nigeria	2000	–	2012;	Pakistan	2003	–	2008;	
Panama	2003	–	2012;	Poland	1998	-	2007;	
Swaziland	2007	–	2012;	Syria	1990	–	2010;	
United	States	2001	–	2010;	Yemen	2000	–	2012;	
Zambia	2005	–	2011	
	
POLARIZ	=	1	
N	=	35	
Bolivia	2003	–	2005;	Brazil	2007	–	2012;	Chile	
1993,	2010	–	2012;	Korea	2001	–	2004;	Mexico	
2001	–	2006,	2010	–	2012;	Niger	1995,	1996;	
Poland	2011	–	2012;	Ukraine	1998	–	99,	2000	–	
2002	
	
POLARIZ	=	2	
N	=	33	
Bolivia	2000	–	2002;	Brazil	2000	–	2006;	Chile	
1994	–	2001;	Ghana	2001	–	2004;	Maldives	
2010	–	2012;	Mexico	2007	–	2009;	Poland	2008	
–	2010;	United	States	2011,	2012	
	
POLARIZ	=	0	
N	=	25	
Egypt	2004	–	
2005;	Greece	
1980	–	1986;	
Lebanon	2000	–	
2012;	Yemen	
1999	
	
POLARIZ	=	1	
No	records	
	
POLARIZ	=	2	
N	=	4	
Pakistan	2009	-	
2012	
POLARIZ	=	0	
N	=	205	
Australia	1989	–	2010;	Belize	2002	–	2012;	
Canada	1981	–	2004,	2012;	Ethiopia	1996	–	
2000,	2006	–	2012;	Fiji	2000	–	2001;	France	
1983	–	1986,	2003	–	2012;	Greece	1987	–	
1999;	Hungary	2007	–	2012;	Italy	1995	–	96,	
2002	–	2008;	Japan	1981	–	83,	1987	–	2012;	
Lesotho	2000	–	2002,	2008	–	2012;	New	
Zealand	1985	–	1994;	Spain	1985	–	93,	2001	–	
2004,	2012;	Trinidad	and	Tobago	2001	–	2012;	
United	Kingdom	1980	–	2010;		
	
POLARIZ	=	1	
N	=	12	
Hungary	2005	–	06;	Italy	1994	,	1997	–	2001;	
Latvia	2007	–	2010	
		
POLARIZ	=	2	
N	=	104	
Australia	1999	–	2012;	Canada	1980,	2005	–	
2011;	France	1987	–	2002;	Germany	1991	–	
2012;	Greece	1993;	Italy	2009	–	2012;	Japan	
1980,	1984	–	86,	1994	–	96;	New	Zealand	1995	
–	2012;	1994	–	2011;	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
2000;	United	Kingdom	2011	-	2012	
Proportional	
elections	
POLARIZ	=	0	
N	=	59	
Algeria	2003	–	2007;	Cape	Verde	2002	–	2011;	
Kazakhstan	2008	–	2012;	Liberia	2000	–	2003;	
Namibia	2006	–	2012;	Niger	2010	–	2011;	Peru	
2000	–	2012;	Poland	1998	–	2006;	Ukraine	
2011	–	2012;	Uruguay	2005	–	2012	
	
POLARIZ	=	1	
N	=	17	
Algeria	2001,	2002,	2008	–	2012;	Cape	Verde	
2012;	Israel	2001;	Peru	2001	–	2006;	Poland	
1996	–	97	
	
POLARIZ	=	2	
N	=	7	
Colombia	1999	–	2002;	Israel	2000;	Uruguay	
2003	-	2004	
POLARIZ	=	0	
N	=	25	
Bulgaria	2000	–	
2001;	Estonia	
1996	–	1999;	
Guyana	2007	–	
2012;	South	
Africa	2000	–	
2012;	
	
POLARIZ	=	1	
No	records	
	
POLARIZ	=	2	
N	=	2	
Estonia	2000	-	
2001	
POLARIZ	=	0	
N	=	29	
Bulgaria	2010	–	2012;	Ireland	1980	–	81,	
2007;	FYR	Macedonia	2003	–	2011;	Portugal	
2006	–	2009;	Turkey	2003	–	2012	
	
POLARIZ	=	1	
N	=	62	
Finland	1991	–	95,	2003	-	2011;	Iceland	1988	–	
91,	2000	–	2007;	Ireland	1988	–	94,	1998	-	
2012;	Israel	2002	–	2003;	Italy	1988	–	1993;	
Latvia	2000	–	2006	
	
POLARIZ	=	2	
N	=	213	
Austria	1988	–	2012;	Belgium	1980	–	2012;	
Denmark	1995	–	2012;	Finland	1980	–	90,	
1996	–	2002,	2012;	Iceland	1982	–	99,	2008	–	
09;	Ireland	1982	–	87,	1995	–	97;	Israel	2004	–	
2012;	Netherlands	1995	–	2012;	Norway	1980	
–	2012;	Portugal	1997	–	2012;	Sweden	1993	–	
2012;	Turkey	2002		
Source:	Database	of	Political	Institutions					
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Table	4	Average	values	of	current	fiscal	aggregates,	%	of	the	GDP	
Gross	public	revenues		 Political	system	
Electoral	regime	 Presidential	 Assembly	–	Elected	President	 Parliamentary	
Plural	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	26,827		POLARIZ	=1	26,918		POLARIZ	=	2	26,736		
POLARIZ	=	0	24,471		 POLARIZ	=	2	13,579		
POLARIZ	=	0	36,904		POLARIZ	=1	41,829		POLARIZ	=	2	40,563		
Proportional	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	29,308		POLARIZ	=1	31,545		POLARIZ	=	2	28,757		
POLARIZ	=	0	29,818		 POLARIZ	=	2	35,298		
POLARIZ	=	0	34,338		POLARIZ	=1	42,733		POLARIZ	=	2	48,972		
	
Gross	public	expenditures		 Political	system	
Electoral	regime	 Presidential	 Assembly	–	Elected	President	 Parliamentary	
Plural	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	29,052		POLARIZ	=	1	28,707		POLARIZ	=	2	30,884		
POLARIZ	=	0	34,103		POLARIZ	=	2	20,113		
POLARIZ	=	0	40,072		POLARIZ	=	1	46,832		POLARIZ	=	2	42,453		
Proportional	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	30,156		POLARIZ	=	1	33,067		POLARIZ	=	2	32,029		
POLARIZ	=	0	31,55		POLARIZ	=	2	34,134		
POLARIZ	=	0	37,476		POLARIZ	=	1	45,796		POLARIZ	=	2	49,926			 	
Structural	fiscal	balance		 Political	system	
Electoral	regime	 Presidential	 Assembly	–	Elected	President	 Parliamentary	
Plural	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0						-2,651		POLARIZ	=	1	-2,155		POLARIZ	=	2	-4,247		
POLARIZ	=	0	-16,676		 POLARIZ	=	2	n.a.		
POLARIZ	=	0	-3,643		POLARIZ	=	1	-4,305		POLARIZ	=	2	-1,726		
Proportional	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	-1,913		POLARIZ	=	1	-2,676		POLARIZ	=	2	-2,036		
POLARIZ	=	0	-2,607		POLARIZ	=	2	n.a.		
POLARIZ	=	0	-4,108		POLARIZ	=	1	-3,159		POLARIZ	=	2	-3,089		
Source:	author’s		
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Table	5	Average	values	of	capital	fiscal	aggregates,	%	of	the	GDP	
Gross	public	debt		 Political	system	
Electoral	regime	 Presidential	 Assembly	–	Elected	President	 Parliamentary	
Plural	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	55,186		POLARIZ	=	1	48,927		POLARIZ	=	2	55,383		
POLARIZ	=	0	112,071		POLARIZ	=	2	60,978		
POLARIZ	=	0	70,739		POLARIZ	=	1	75,684		POLARIZ	=	2	53,648		
Proportional	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	90,934		POLARIZ	=	1	39,432		POLARIZ	=	2	63,105		
POLARIZ	=	0	40,553		POLARIZ	=	2	4,954		
POLARIZ	=	0	42,491		POLARIZ	=	1	53,612		POLARIZ	=	2	62,025		
	
Net	public	debt		 Political	system	
Electoral	regime	 Presidential	 Assembly	–	Elected	President	 Parliamentary	
Plural	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	46,036		POLARIZ	=	1	31,829		POLARIZ	=	2	41,441		
POLARIZ	=	0		POLARIZ	=	1		POLARIZ	=	2			
POLARIZ	=	0	47,574		POLARIZ	=	1	65,77		POLARIZ	=	2	35,039		
Proportional	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	70,994		POLARIZ	=	1	18,32		POLARIZ	=	2	56,36		
POLARIZ	=	0		POLARIZ	=	1		POLARIZ	=	2			
POLARIZ	=	0	34,581		POLARIZ	=	1	18,165		POLARIZ	=	2	15,254			 	
Financial	assets	held	by	the	government	(gross	debt	minus	net	debt)		 Political	system	
Electoral	regime	 Presidential	 Assembly	–	Elected	President	 Parliamentary	
Plural	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	9,151		POLARIZ	=	1	17,098		POLARIZ	=	2	13,942		
POLARIZ	=	0		POLARIZ	=	1		POLARIZ	=	2			
POLARIZ	=	0	23,165		POLARIZ	=	1	9,915		POLARIZ	=	2	18,609		
Proportional	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	19,94		POLARIZ	=	1	21,112		POLARIZ	=	2	6,745		
POLARIZ	=	0		POLARIZ	=	1		POLARIZ	=	2			
POLARIZ	=	0	7,91		POLARIZ	=	1	35,447		POLARIZ	=	2	46,771		
Source:	author’s	 		
